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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4103(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. I: Did Judge Christine Johnson err in treating Judge Samuel McVey's
~

order as an order and not as a commissioner's recommendation subject to a Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure I 08 objection when he was presiding in court instead of a domestic
relations commissioner?
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil procedure
presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Lewis v. Nelson, 2015 UT

~

App 262, l]f8.
Preservation Below. Mr. Nuno did preserve this issue below.

Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err in holding that the father had failed to properly
raise the issue of the constitutionality of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA)?
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.1991).
Preservation Below. Mr. Nuno preserved this limited issue below, but did not
preserve the underlying constitutional issue presented in the following Issue No. 3.

Issue No. 3: Do the provisions of the UUPA, as applied to the facts of this case,
violate the due process provisions of the Utah and United States Constitutions?

Standard of Review: "A constitutional cha11enge to a statute presents a question of

law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness. When addressing such a challenge, this
Court presumes that the statute is valid, and[] resolve[s] any reasonable doubts in favor
of constitutionality." State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, <J[l0 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).

Preservation Below. This issue was not adequately preserved below, as explained
in the Argument section of this brief.
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court commit error in failing to allow Mr. Nuno to

conduct discovery related to the allegations in the Amended Petition?
Standard of Review: The denial of a motion to conduct discovery is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, 'Il 20.
Preservation Below. Mr. Nuno did not preserve this issue below as he never
submitted a motion or obtained a hearing on the issue, and he never attempted to
undertake any form of discovery.
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court fail to make sufficient findings of fact to support its

conclusion that the provisions of UUPA precluded the exercise of jurisdiction in this
matter?
Standard of Review: A challenge to the sufficiency of the findings is reviewed for
clear error. See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 'Il 24.
Preservation Below. Mr. Nuno did not preserve this issue below and does not brief
or even address this issue in his Argument. The Court "generally do[es] not address
unpreserved arguments raised for the first time on appeal." State v. Pham, 2015 UT App
233, 'Il 7. "If an appellant fails to adequately brief an issue on appeal, the appellate court
2

may decline to consider the argument." Jacob v. Cross. 2012 UT App 190. 'H 2.
Therefore. this issue should be rejected by the Court and not be considered.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
1.

UTAH CONST. art. I.§ 7. "No person shall be deprived of life. liberty or
property, without due process oflaw."

2.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. " ... nor shall any State deprive any person oflife.
liberty. or property. without due process of law ... ••

3.

Utah Code § 78B-15-602. "Standing to maintain proceeding." See Brief of

Appellant. Addendum E.
4.

Utah Code§ 78B-15-607. "Limitation - Child having presumed father." See Brief

of Appellant. Addendum F.

5.
~

Parents Act." See Addendum A.
6.

Q)

Utah Code§ 30-5a-101, et seq. "Custody and Visitation for Persons Other than

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 108 .• "Objection to court commissioner's
recommendation." See Addendum B.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

This case involves an individual, Emmanuel Nuno, an alleged biological father,
who claims to have parental rights to two minor children, G.L.H. and H.H., who were
conceived and born to their Mother, Kimberly Lane Hart, and their presumed Father,
Brian J. Hart, during the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Hart. Mr. Nuno appeals the orders
issued by Judge Samuel McVey and Judge Christine S. Johnson, of the Fourth District
Court, Utah County, dismissing Mr. Nuno's paternity action for lack of standing, and
declining to find the Utah Uniform Paternity Act unconstitutional.
Mr. Nuno filed a paternity action in the Fifth District Court, Washington County,
on July 18, 2014. R. 1. The case was transferred by Judge Eric A. Ludlow to the Fourth
District Court, Utah County, where the Mother and the children resided. R. 89. After the
case was transferred, on September 23, 2014, Mother filed a Motion to Dismiss the
petition for lack of standing based on limitations set forth in the UUPA, Utah Code §
78B-15-607. R. 109, 111. On October 7, 2014, Mr. Nuno requested 14 additional days to
supplement his pleadings with constitutional claims. R. 246. The hearing was continued
from November 5, 2014 to November 12, 2014. R. 298. A hearing was held before
Commissioner Thomas Patton on November 12, 2014, at which time the proceedings
were stayed in order to join Mr. Hart as an indispensable party. R. 307. The hearing on
the Motion to Dismiss was then continued two more times until January 22, 2015. R.
307, 336.

4

Mr. Nuno filed an Amended Petition, joining Mr. Hart as a party. R. 309. Mr. and
Mrs. Hart each filed an Answer to the Amended Petition. R. 347,358. On January 22,
2015, the Motion to Dismiss was heard and granted by Judge Samuel McVey, who was
@)

filling in due to Commissioner Patton's illness. R. 513. Mr. Nuno objected to Judge
McVey's decision, R. 379, and Judge Christine S. Johnson denied the objection. R. 513.
Mr. Nuno filed Petitioner's Rules 52 and 59 Motion to Amend Judgment on March 11,

~

2015, R. 430, which was denied by Judge Johnson. R. 499. Then, on May 21, 2015, Mr.
Nuno timely filed this appeal from the orders issued by Judge Mc Vey and Judge Johnson.
l(j)

R. 522.
DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT

Judge Mc Vey granted the Hart's Motion to Dismiss on January 22, 2015 and an
Amended Order on Motion to Dismiss Petition for Paternity was signed by Judge McVey
on May 6, 2015. R. 513. Judge Johnson denied Mr. Nuno's Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation by issuing a Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendations, on March 4, 2015. R. 427. Judge Johnson denied
Mr. Nuno's Motion to Amend by issuing a Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Motion to
Amend Order on April 30, 2015. R. 499.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

Mr. Nuno alleged many facts in his Petition, Amended Petition, Affidavit in

Support of Motion for Temporary Orders, and Declaration of Emmanuel Nuno, which he
~

~

has set forth in his brief. R. 1, 46, 142, 309.
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2.

Mr. Nuno incorrectly asserts on pages 24 and 27 of his Brief that the

children were "admittedly fathered by Mr. Nuno." That is not true and is not found in the
record. Neither of the Harts acknowledged or admitted on the record that the children
were fathered by Mr. Nuno.
3.

The Harts denied the factual allegations and filed a Motion to Dismiss

based on Mr. Nuno's lack of standing. R. 109,347,358.
4.

Mrs. Hart at no time was married to Mr. Nuno. R. 266.

5.

Kimberly Lane and Brian J. Hart were married on July 7, 2007 and had two

minor children, not the subject of this action. R. 266, 276.
6.

The Harts divorced on March 26, 2012 and remarried one another on

August 21, 2012. R. 266, 276.
7.

Their third minor child, G.L.H., was born on August 23, 2012 in Coconino

County, Arizona. R. 266, 276.
8.

Their fourth minor child, H.H., was born on December 4, 2013 in Utah

County, Utah. R. 266, 276.
9.

Both of the subject children were born as issue of the Hart's marriage. R.

10.

Mr. Hart was present at the births of both G.L.H. and H.H. R. 276.

11.

Mr. Hart is listed as the Father on both children's birth certificates. R. 266,

12.

The children have always had the last name of Hart. R. 266.

276.

276.

6

13.

The Harts intend to remain married and raise all four of their children

together as children of their marriage. R. 266, 276.
14.

Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Hart have challenged the paternity of their children.

R. 266,276.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court should AFFIRM the Order dismissing Mr. Nuno's paternity petition
and action for lack of standing and should not create a new constitutional right

Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation. Judge Johnson was correct in
~

denying Mr. Nuno's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation because Judge
Mc Vey is a sitting district court judge whose decisions cannot be objected to pursuant to
Rule I 08 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A domestic relations commissioner and a
district court judge are two distinct judicial officers and a judge cannot sit or act as a
domestic relations commissioner. In proceeding before Judge Mc Vey, Mr. Nuno did not
justifiably rely on any representations that Judge McVey's decision could be objected to.

Discovery and Rule 56(f). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to allow Mr. Nuno to conduct further discovery prior to the Court determining that he
lacked standing to contest the paternity of the minor children. Mr. Nuno failed to
preserve this issue as he never attempted any method of discovery, failed to provide his
required initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedurewhich must be satisfied before requesting any other discovery-and he never noticed the
~

issue for hearing. Further, Rule 56(t) does not apply to a motion to dismiss on a
jurisdictional basis. Yet Mr. Nuno still received the benefit provided for in the rule: he

7

received a continuance and additional time before the hearing during which time he could
have conducted additional discovery.
Constitutionality of the UUPA. Mr. Nuno did not adequately raise or contest the
constitutionality of the UUPA in the trial court, and therefore did not preserve the issue
for appeal. Mr. Nuno failed to specifically raise his constitutional argument, making only
a general invocation that the UUP A violated his constitutional rights. He did not
introduce any relevant legal authority or provide any analysis or application of the
alleged facts to any specific constitutional right.
Even if the issue was adequately raised and preserved for appeal, the UUPA does
not violate the due process provisions of the Utah or United States Constitutions as
applied to Mr. Nuno's alleged facts of this case. The Supreme Court, in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), has already declined to find constitutional rights or
protections for biological fathers of children born within a marriage.
Despite the fact that Mr. Nuno does not have constitutional rights he asserts, Utah
Code still satisfies the due process that he claims. The Utah Adoption Act provides strict
requirements for unwed biological fathers to follow to preserve the opportunity to be
heard, and Mr. Nuno failed to strictly comply. Utah's Custody and Visitation for Persons
Other than Parents Act also provides an opportunity to be heard on custody and visitation
0

for persons other than those legally defined as parents. Utah Code § 30-5a-101, et. seq.
Since Mr. Nuno is legally not a parent to the children, he had an opportunity to proceed
pursuant to this chapter, but failed to do so.
To allow Mr. Nuno to continue this case, pursue discovery, require court
8

involvement and hold trial on the issues would be an unconstitutional violation of the
Harts' right to privacy within their marriage and family. The attack would also violate
the constitutional rights of Mr. and Mrs. Hart by interfering with their fundamental
parental rights to raise their children.
ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals should Affirm the trial court's dismissal for lack of standing
because (I) the issues were not properly preserved; (2) Mr. Nuno has no substantive
constitutional rights; (3) he is not entitled to due process protections; and (4) even if he
ti,

were, the provisions of Utah Code§ 30-Sa-101 et seq. satisfy the demands of due process
by granting him a reasonable opportunity to be heard regarding custody of and visitation
with the minor children. Further, to allow Mr. Nuno to proceed would violate the
constitutional rights of Mr. and Mrs. Hart and their entire family. Therefore, the Court
should affirm the dismissal of Mr. Nuno's petition for paternity.

I.

THE DECISION OF A DISTRICT COURT JUDGE IS NOT
SUBJECT TO A RULE 108 OBJECTION TO COURT
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION
A. Judges are Distinct from Court Commissioners and May Serve
Temporarily in a Commissioner's Court as a Judge, but Not as a
Commissioner.

Rule 108 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the opportunity for a party
to object to the decision of a domestic relations commissioner and have the objection
heard by a district court judge. Utah R. Civ. P. 108. The plain language of the rule
~

indicates that this opportunity to object applies only to the recommendations of court
commissioners and does not apply to any other judicial officers.

9

District court judges and domestic relations commissioners are separate and distinct
positions created by different sections of Utah law. District court judges are authorized and
provided for in Article VIII of the Utah Constitution and are governed in accordance with
various sections of Title 78A, Chapters 2 and 5 of the Utah Code. Judges are selected from a
judicial nominating committee, appointed by the governor, confirmed by the Senate, and retained
by election. See Utah Code§ 78A-10-101, et seq., and Utah Code§ 20A-12-201. Court
commissioners, on the other hand, are created by statute, Utah Code § 78A-5- l 07, and are
"quasi-judicial officers of courts of record and have limited judicial authority ... " Utah Code §
78A-5-107(l)(a). Court commissioners are appointed by the Judicial Council with the
concurrence of a majority of judges in that district. Id. at 107(2)(a). Therefore, it is not possible
to be both a judge and a commissioner at the same time.
Utah Code provides more direct clarification on this issue by stating that a 'judge of a
court of record may serve temporarily as a judge in another geographic di vision or in another

court of record ... " Id. at§ 78A-2-225 (emphasis added). Court commissioners serve in "courts
of record." Id. at§ 78A-5-107(1)(a). Therefore, a judge is authorized to serve temporarily in
place of a court commissioner, but he or she does so as a judge and not as a limited court
commissioner.
There is no dispute that Judge Mc Vey heard and decided this matter while filling in for
Commissioner Patton. Although at the conclusion of his ruling, Judge Mc Vey made statements
indicating his belief that his decision may be subject to an objection because he was filling in for
Commissioner Patton, Judge McVey was incorrect, and Judge Johnson's decision to decline the
Objection was correct. Judge Mc Vey was serving "as a judge ... in another court ofrecord,"
consistent with Utah Code§ 78A-2-225. His decision was therefore not subject to a Rule 108

10

C'I

\llii'

objection.
In addition to arguing that he simply has the right to object, Mr. Nuno appears to argue
that it would be unjust to not allow an objection to Judge McVey's recommendation because he
'justifiably relied on Judge McVey's statements made during the course of the hearing." Brief of

Appellant, p. 20. However, Mr. Nuno fails to address the fact that Judge Mc Vey did not make
these statements until the conclusion of the hearing, and that Judge Mc Vey did not make any
~

promises, confirmed by his statement that Judge Johnson "may or may not agree with me ... " R.
499. The record is clear that both parties consented to Judge Mc Vey hearing the case and that
neither party requested a continuance in order to appear first before the court commissioner. R.
427. Therefore, there could not have been any 'justifiable reliance" on Judge McVey's
statements at the conclusion of the hearing and Mr. Nuno waived any opportunity to have the
decision objected to in accordance with Rule I 08.

B. Proceedings Before a Commissioner Do Not Excuse Presenting All
Evidence and Argument
While a court commissioner's recommendation may be objected to and taken to
the judge for ultimate decision, "any evidence, whether by proffer, testimony or exhibit,
not presented to the commissioner shall not be presented to the judge." Utah R. Civ. P.
108(c). Therefore, any evidence that a party desires to be considered by the court must
be presented to the commissioner.
Mr. Nuno asserts that "practicing attorneys know that normally proceedings before
a commissioner are abbreviated ... " and then implies that because of this, he should be
excused from presenting complete evidence and argument for his case. Brief of

Appellant, pp. 21-23. Certainly practicing attorneys in Utah County know that
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commissioner practice follows Rule 101 and that evidence is presented by affidavit,
attachments, and proffer. However, they also know that they must present and argue all
facts and arguments that they want the court to consider because they will be excluded by
the judge if they were not presented to the commissioner. Therefore, it cannot be an
excuse for failure to present everything to a commissioner.

C. Complete Due Process Was Provided and Exercised by the Court
Finally, Mr. Nuno claims that not allowing a Rule 108 objection violates his due
process rights, claiming that he was "denied the rights set by statute and rule that are
attendant to filing an objection ... " Brief of Appellant, p. 22. This is far from true. As
outlined above, there is no right to object to a judge's ruling. Further, the record
indicates he had an opportunity to object to Judge McVey hearing the motion and request
a continuance. Instead, he consented to having Judge McVey decide the case. By doing
so, he cannot now claim there has been any violation of due process.
Therefore, Judge Johnson was correct in denying Mr. Nuno's Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation and the decision should be affirmed.
II.

MR. NUNO WAIVED AND FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS
CONTENTION THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL
DISCOVERY
The denial of a motion to conduct discovery is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, 'Ii 20.
A. Mr. Nuno Engaged in No Discovery and Failed to Comply With Rules 26

and 101.
For an issue to be preserved for appeal, "it must be (1) raised in a timely fashion,
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(2) be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority." Hill v. Superior Property Management Svcs., 2013
UT 60, <JI 46 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In the context of discovery, a party must actually seek discovery below in order to
preserve the issue on appeal. See Al-Ali v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2007 UT
App 156 (not for official publication). In the Al-Ali case, the plaintiffs argued on appeal
that discovery was necessary to fully prosecute their claim. However, the plaintiffs made
"no discovery requests below, nor was discovery raised in any manner before the trial
~

court." Id. The Court then made the determination that "[b]ecause discovery was not
sought below, this court cannot address the issue now." Id.
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the general governing
provisions of discovery. This rule requires that initial disclosures must be completed
before a party may engage in any other discovery: "[A] party may not seek discovery

~

from any source before that party's initial disclosure obligations are satisfied." Utah R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(2).
In domestic relations cases before a court commissioner, "An application to a
court commissioner for an order shall be by motion ... The moving party shall file the
motion and attachments with the clerk of court and obtain a hearing date and time." Id. at
I0I(a)-(b) (2014).
In this case, Mr. Nuno waived and failed to preserve his claim to a right to conduct

·~

additional discovery by failing to even make a discovery request. The record below
indicates that no requests for discovery were made pursuant to any discovery rule from
13
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26 to 36-no depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents or things, requests for
admissions, depositions, etc. Importantly, Mr. Nuno failed to provide his own initial
disclosures required by Rule 26(a). By failing to provide the disclosures, he was
precluded by Rule 26(c )(2) from seeking any other discovery.
While Mr. Nuno did raise the issue of discovery in an Affidavit by requesting
additional time, he did not preserve this issue as he failed to follow the requirements of
Rule 101 by not filing a motion and by not obtaining a hearing date and time for the
motion to be heard. R. 240. Because of this, the trial court never had a proper
opportunity to rule on the issue. Despite raising the issue by affidavit, Mr. Nuno's failure
to complete initial disclosures and attempt any discovery pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure matches the failure in the Al-Ali case, and his failure and waiver prevent him
from arguing the need for discovery on appeal.

B. Rule 56(f) Does Not Apply in This Case, But Mr. Nuno Nonetheless
Received the Benefit Contemplated by the Rule.
Mr. Nuno bases his claim for additional discovery on Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which governs Summary Judgment. However, the Motion before the
trial court was a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12, and not one for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56.
Rule 12 provides limited instances in which a motion to dismiss should be treated
as a motion for summary judgment:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
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summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). The language of the Rule clearly indicates that this applies only to
a motion asserting defense number (6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Id. Similarly, if the court considers matters outside the pleadings on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, it "shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56 ... " Id. at 12(c).
This matter involves neither a motion for judgment on the pleadings nor a motion
~

asserting failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Harts' motion
was one to dismiss for lack of standing, which is a jurisdictional issue. See Hogs R Us v.
Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT 21, <J[ 7 ("Because lack of standing is jurisdictional, parties
may raise it as an issue at any time in the proceedings ... "); see also Osguthorpe v. Wolf
Mountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 29, <JI 14. Therefore, Rule 56 and its discovery
provisions do not apply to the case.
Even if Rule 56 applies, the applicable remedy sought by Mr. Nuno is that the
court "may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(f) (2014). Although the request was never ruled on because of Mr. Nuno's failure to
follow Rule 101 in bringing the issue before the court, he still received the benefit that
could have been ordered: the hearing on the motion to dismiss was continued three times

~

and was not held until January 22, 2015, more than three months from the time he filed
his Affidavit. R. 298, 307, 336. His choice not to conduct discovery within that time
15

period was his own. The trial court did not prevent him from doing so, and therefore
there was no error.

III.

MR. NUNO'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS WERE NOT
PRESERVED AND THE UUPA IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES
NOT VIOLATE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MR. NUNO

"A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law, which [this
Court] review[s] for correctness. When addressing such a challenge, this Court presumes
that the statute is valid, and[] resolve[s] any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality." State v. Gamer, 2008 UT App 32, 'IUO (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals should uphold the constitutionality of the UUPA because (1)
Mr. Nuno did not properly preserve the issue; (2) Mr. Nuno has no substantive
constitutional rights; (3) he is not entitled to due process protections; and (4) even if he
were, Utah Code satisfies due process by providing Mr. Nuno a reasonable opportunity to
be heard, but he failed to appropriately do so.

A. Mr. Nuno Failed To Adequately Preserve By Not Briefing The
Constitutional Issue or Citing to Legal Authority Below.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is "resolute in [its] refusal to take up
constitutional issues which have not been properly preserved, framed and briefed ... "
Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, <J[ 14. To preserve an issue for appeal, it must be
adequately raised in the trial court to afford the court a "meaningful opportunity to rule
on the ground that is advanced on appeal." Hill v. Superior Property Management Svcs.,
2013 UT 60, <J[ 46. "The general invocation of a theory is insufficient. [T]o be preserved,
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an issue must be ( 1) raised in a timely fashion, (2) be specifically raised, and (3) the
challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Id.
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Earl, 2015 UT 12 <j[ 19
("[Defendant's] briefing in the Fourth District failed to present any constitutional
analysis, and for that reason we decline to reach her arguments as applied to that case on
grounds of preservation").
In the trial court, Mr. Nuno did generally invoke the issue of due process rights.
However, he did not do so specifically and failed to introduce any relevant legal authority
~

or analysis. In his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed October 7,
2014, he generally invoked the constitution and rights of a biological father, and
requested an additional 14 days to brief the issue. R. 137. He filed a Motion requesting
the additional time on the same day. R. 246. The hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was
continued from November 5, 2014 to November 12, 2014. R. 298. Then Commissioner
Patton continued the hearing from November 12 to December 10, 2014. R. 307. The
hearing was continued again from December 10 to January 22, 2015. R. 336. Despite
receiving more than 100 additional days from the time he requested 14 days to brief the
constitutional issues, Mr. Nuno never submitted a brief with any constitutional analysis.
Prior to the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the only other reference to the
constitutional issue was in paragraph 9 of Mr. Nuno's prayer for judgment in his
Amended Petition, in which he stated simply that to deny him paternity it would be a
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denial of his constitutional rights. R. 316. Mr. Nuno provided no analysis and no citation
to any legal authority to support his general statement. When considering the issue at the
17

hearing, Judge Mc Vey found that "there is no provision of the constitution referred to
(40.25). Petitioner stated today that it is the Due Process clause" and that "the issue was
never raised in a manner that would give enough notice to the Respondent to indicate
precisely how it is facially unconstitutional, or unconstitutional as applied." R. 516.
Not until after Judge McVey's order dismissing and Judge Johnson's Ruling and
Order on Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation did he make any
citation to constitutional legal authority. R. 443.
Because Mr. Nuno did not properly raise the issue of the constitutionality of the
UUP A below, it was therefore not preserved and should not be considered by the Court
on appeal.

B. Facts Viewed in Light Favorable to Mr. Nuno
"On appeal from a district court's decision granting a motion to dismiss, [the
court] view[s] the facts pied in the complaint and all reasonable inferences from them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Scott v. Utah County. 2015 UT 64, <JI 4.
However, the court need not accept the legal conclusions. Id. at 13.
Although the Harts have denied the factual allegations, it is recognized that for
purposes of the motion to dismiss the court takes the facts in the light most favorable to
Mr. Nuno. However, conclusory statements need not be considered true or given
preference.
One such conclusory statement by Mr. Nuno is his allegation that the Harts'
marriage is a "sham marriage." Mr. Nuno's assertion is not true and should not be taken
in a light favorable to him because it is not a factual allegation. Further, sham marriages
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are addressed by courts almost exclusively in the context of immigration-motivated
marriages. In Utah there is apparently only one case that mentions "sham marriage" and
it is in the context of a false, immigration-motivated marriage. See In re Marriage of
Kunz, 2006 UT App 151. In the Kunz case, the Court of Appeals determines that sham
immigration marriages are voidable under Utah law, but not void, meaning the marriage
"is valid for all purposes until voided or annulled in a proper proceeding ... " Id. at 'II 37
(citing Estate of Stefke, 538 F.2d 730, 736 (7 th Cir. 1976)).
The record does not indicate any facts supporting the allegation that the Harts'
~

marriage is a sham marriage. The record does reflect that the Harts were married from
2007 to March 2007, then remarried in August 2012 and are presently married. R. 266,
276. During the course of their marriage the Harts have had four children conceived and
born to their marriage. R. 266, 276. The Harts intend to remain married to each other and
to raise their four children as a family. R. 266, 276.
Therefore, while the Court should certainly consider the facts alleged by Mr. Nuno
in the light most favorable to him for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court should
not consider his conclusory allegation of a sham marriage when the record clearly
indicates otherwise.
C. The UUPA Does Not Violate Mr. Nuno's Due Process Rights
"The Due Process Clause has been construed to encompass both a procedural and
a substantive component. Under the procedural component, the courts have long
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recognized a general right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Thus, for rights the
law deems subject to formal process (in courts or other adjudicative bodies), due process
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requires notice reasonably calculated to inform parties that their rights are in jeopardy
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the course of such proceedings." Bolden v.
Does (In re Adoption of J.S.), 2014 UT 51, 'Il 20 (internal citations omitted).
"A procedural due process attack on a ... procedural bar would take the form of an
assertion that such a limitation forecloses any meaningful opportunity for the plaintiff to
protect its rights. A substantive challenge would take a different form. It would involve a
broadside attack on the fairness of the procedural bar or limitation, on the ground that the
right foreclosed is so fundamental or important that it is protected from extinguishment."
Id. at 'Il 22.
"Yet the promise of the Due Process Clause is limited. It is a protection against
state action-not a charter aimed at regulating the actions of private parties." In the
Matter of the Adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, 'Il 16.
Mr. Nuno does not argue that the UUPA is unconstitutional on its face. Instead
Mr. Nuno argues first that he "was entitled to full constitutional protection" and second
that he "was deprived of any mechanism to protect his rights and, therefore, section 607
of the UUPA is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case." Brief of Appellant,
pp. 39, 42. Because the substantive rights determine the standard of constitutional
scrutiny used in analyzing the procedural issues, this brief will first address substantive
due process.

20

1. Mr. Nuno Is Not Entitled to Substantive Due Process.
a. Substantive Due Process rights Must Be Deeply Rooted in
the Nation's History and Tradition.
"Substantive due process concerns the content of the rules specifying when a right
can be lost or impaired." Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P. 2d 199, 204. It
deals with the fairness of a procedural bar or limitation that is so fundamental that it is
protected against extinguishment. See Bolden, 2014 UT 51, <JI 22. However, "the Due
Process Clause is not a license for the judicial fabrication of rights that judges might
~

prefer, on reflection, to have been enshrined in the constitution. [The Court's] role in
interpreting the constitution is one of interpretation, not common-law-making. Thus, the
judicial recognition of new fundamental rights of substantive due process is the
exception, not the rule." Id. at <JI 30. To receive constitutional protection, substantive
rights should be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and in the history
and culture of Western civilization."

Id. at <JI 39 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).
While parental rights have long been recognized as rights protected by the
constitution, the full fundamental rights and protections are not automatic and available
to every person simply claiming to be a parent. For example, an unwed father's rights are
not necessarily fundamental, and "the guarantee of due process recognizes only 'an
inchoate interest' of an unwed biological father" that does not rise to the level of a
~

fundamental right unless perfected by the actions of the unwed biological father. Id. at <JI
44 (citing T.M. v. B.B. (In re Adoption of T.B.). 2010 UT 42, <JI 31 n.19). To receive a
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heightened standard of scrutiny, "the standard requires more than a broad, general
assertion that parental rights are significant and traditionally respected. To trigger such a
standard, a party would have to make the more specific showing ... that the precise
interest asserted by the parent is one that is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition and in the history and culture of Western civilization." Bolden, 2014 UT 51, CJ{

57 (Plurality opinion)(emphasis added).
b. Alleged Biological Fathers of Children Born Into a
Marriage Do Not Have a Constitutional Right to Contest Paternity of Children.

The Supreme Court of the United States has already taken the opportunity to
review the constitutionality of a state statute that prevented standing and foreclosed the
opportunity of a biological father to establish his paternity of a child who was born to a
married mother and her husband. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Under
California law at the time, a child born during a marriage was presumed to be a child of
the marriage and only the husband or wife, in limited circumstances, could rebut the
presumption. Id. at 113.
In Michael H., a mother was married to husband but had an affair with biological
father, resulting in the birth of a child. A few months after the child's birth, the husband
moved to New York and the mother and child remained in California. During the child's
first three years, she and mother resided for different extended periods of time with the
biological father, another man, and husband. Biological father and mother completed
blood tests that confirmed he was the biological father, signed a stipulation agreeing to
such, and held the child out together as biological father's. Finally, when the child was
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three years old, mother and husband reconciled. Against the recommendation of the
appointed guardian ad litem, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of mother
and husband, dismissing biological father's paternity action and request for custody and
parent time.
In Michael H., the biological father unsuccessfully argued that the Supreme Court
had already established that "a liberty interest is created by biological fatherhood plus an
established parental relationship" with his child. Id. at 123. The Court disagreed and said
the biological father's argument "distorts the rationale of those cases. As [the Court]
~

view[s] them, they rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the historic respectindeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the
relationship that develop within the unitary family." Id. (emphasis added). The Court
then went on to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the biological father's action, finding
the statute constitutional.
The Supreme Court has considered the constitutional arguments of biological
fathers of children born into a marriage, and has rejected the notion that there is any
substantive constitutional right that warrants any procedural protection. Therefore, the
UUPA cannot be held to violate the United States Constitution.
Similarly, the Alabama Court of Appeals has recently considered the
constitutionality of a similar statute that prevents biological fathers from contesting the
paternity of their children that are born with a presumed father. C.E.G. v. A.LA. and
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T.E., 2130910 Ala. Court of Civil Appeals (2015). In C.E.G., the trial court dismissed a
biological father's paternity action based on lack of standing to bring the action, because
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such was foreclosed under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act. Id. The Alabama Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision, upholding the constitutionality of the law and finding
that it did not violate substantive due process.
Section 607 of the UUPA is very similar to both the California statute in Michael
H. and the Alabama statute in C.E.G. in that it contains an irrebuttable presumption
against a biological father (or alleged biological father) of a child born to a mother with a
presumed father. Section 607 limits standing to contest paternity to only the mother and
presumed father "at any time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the
time of the divorce of the parents." Utah Code§ 78B-15-607(1).
The basis of this standing limitation is a "fundamental" state policy reason related
to the protection of marriage and children: "protecting the marriage, the child, and the
relationship between the child and the presumed father [from] attack by outsiders to the
marriage, an attack that might discourage the presumed father from staying married to the
mother and assuming parental responsibilities for the child." J.L.C. v. K.A.A., 2014 UT
App 245, CfI 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). This fundamental policy of the state
suggests a compelling state interest in protecting marriage, families, and children from
outsider attacks, even if-or perhaps especially if-that outsider claims to be or is the
biological father.
Although Utah courts have not yet addressed the constitutionality of the UUPA
and its limitation of standing, similar statutes have been upheld by the Supreme Court of
the United States and by the state of Alabama. Therefore, Utah is not alone in preventing
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attacks from outsiders to a marriage, and section 607 of the UUPA is not a violation of
the Constitution of the United States or the State of Utah.
c. Mr. Nuno Has No Substantive Constitutional Rights and
the Court Should Not Create Any New Ones.
In this matter, Mr. Nuno claims to be the biological father of two of the four minor
children of Mr. and Mrs. Hart. He likewise claims to have an established relationship
with the minor children. Even if both of these allegations were true, Mr. Nuno is not
entitled to any substantive due process protections because the constitution does not

vo

recognize the right of a biological father to challenge or establish legal paternity of
children born to a married couple.
To prevail on his claim that he is entitled to substantive due process protection of
the Utah Constitution, and that the UUPA violates those rights, Mr. Nuno would have to
do more than make a "broad, general assertion" that he is entitled to such rights. He must
specifically show that "the precise interest asserted by the parent is one that is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and in the history and culture of Western
civilization."' Bolden, 2014 UT 51, <JI 57. Mr. Nuno has not done so. Indeed, he cannot
do so because the rights he claims are clearly not rooted in our Nation's history and
tradition, as they have been rejected time and again.
Likewise, Mr. Nuno cannot prevail on his argument that he is entitled to
substantive due process rights based on the Constitution of the United States. The

,~

Supreme Court, having the opportunity to define, expand or create new rights for people
in Mr. Nuno's position, declined to do so. Mr. Nuno's allegations are very similar to
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those of the biological father in Michael H. However, the biological father in Michael H.
also had a signed stipulation and a blood test confirming that he was the father. Even
still, the Supreme Court rejected the due process argument and affirmed the dismissal of
the father's case.
Therefore, Mr. Nuno is not entitled to substantive due process under either the
Utah or United States constitutions and his claims should therefore be dismissed.

d. Mr. Nuno is Not an Unwed Biological Father
In his brief, Mr. Nuno claims that "the determination of his constitutional parental

rights should be made on the assumption that Mother was in fact single when the two
children, conceived with Mother, were born." Brief of Appellant, p. 38. This is not
correct and Mr. Nuno cites absolutely no legal basis for that assumption. Mr. and Mrs.
Hart were legally married at all relevant times in this action. We cannot simply pretend
that they are not. Mr. and Mrs. Hart were married at the time their third child G.L.H.,
was conceived and born, and at the time their fourth and youngest child, H.H., was
conceived and born. The Court cannot simply ignore this fact, which is the most
essential and relevant fact in determining standing in this case. Further, Mr. Nuno never
objected to the authenticity of or contested the evidence or the fact of the Harts' marriage.
He only made a conclusive assertion that it was a "sham" marriage.
Mr. Nuno' s assertion also does not make sense in light of what he is requesting.
He requests to be treated as an unwed biological father within the meaning of the Utah
Adoption Act because Mr. Nuno "cannot be held to a standard that makes him
responsible for Mother and Husband's tortious and improper conduct described herein."
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Brief of Appellant, p. 38. However, the same Adoption Act provides that a parent "is not
excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this chapter based upon any action,
statement, or omission of the other parent or third parties. Any person injured by
~

fraudulent representations or actions in connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue
civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law." Utah Code § 78B-6-106( 1)(2). The Utah Supreme Court upheld this provision in Adoption of B.Y. 2015 UT 67, 'II
16 ("Yet the promise of the Due Process Clause is limited. It is a protection against state
action-not a charter aimed at regulating the actions of private parties.").
Mr. Nuno's argument that he should be held to a different standard based on the
Harts' actions therefore cannot be accepted.
Regardless, by Mr. Nuno's own admission, he was in fact aware of the Harts'
marriage and, presumably, that the conception of G .L.H. occurred during the marriage.
He claims that he viewed the Decree of Divorce, dated March 2012. Therefore he knew
that the Harts were married when G.L.H. was conceived. Even if he did not learn of the
Harts' remarriage a few months later, he could have and should have known. The Decree
of Divorce referenced by Mr. Nuno states that Mrs. Hart was "restored the use of the
former name of Kimberly Lane." R. 173. However, the Gold's Gym document filed by
Mr. Nuno lists Mrs. Hart's name as "Hart" and provides a Utah County address, not a
Washington County address. R. 204. Further, Mr. Hart was present at both children's
births and is listed on both of their birth certificates, and the children have always had the
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last name of"Hart." R. 266,276. If Mr. Nuno truly did not know that Mr. and Mrs. Hart
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were married, he at least could have known had he been present at the births or even
simply taken a look at the birth certificates of the children.
Mr. Nuno also should not be considered an unwed biological father because he
legally is not an unwed biological father. He is simply an alleged biological father of a
child with a presumed and legal father. He does not have the same constitutional rights
and protections as an unwed biological father in an adoption action. As shown above in
parts b. and c., Mr. Nuno is not entitled to any constitutional right to contest the paternity
of the minor children. He therefore should not be considered an unwed biological father.

2. There Was No Violation of Procedural Due Process
Because there is no substantive right enjoyed by Mr. Nuno, there is no need to
address the procedures in place that would otherwise protect his rights. See Michael H.,
491 U.S. 110, 121 (the question ofirrebuttable presumptions one of substance and "we
therefore reject Michael's procedural due process challenge and proceed to his
substantive claim"); see also Bolden, 2014 UT 51, 'Il 20 (stating that procedural due
process protections are "for rights the law deems subject to formal process").
Although no procedural due process is necessary, the UUPA, along with other
related statutory provisions, nevertheless do satisfy procedural due process by providing
"a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Because Utah courts have not considered the
constitutional rights of an alleged biological father whose child is born to a married
mother with a presumed father, the most similar type of case to draw from by analogy
would be that of an unwed biological father in an adoption case, which is at least a step
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above an alleged biological father of a child with a presumed father. For purposes of this
section, the standard used in those cases will be adopted here for analysis.

a. Standard of Scrutiny
As Mr. Nuno set forth in his brief, in a case of an unwed biological father who
contests an adoption, the standard of scrutiny under the federal and state Due Process
Clauses is a highly deferential standard of arbitrariness or rationality. See Brief of
Appellant, p. 40; see also Bolden, 2014 UT 51, <J[<Il 49, 53. For rights the law deems
subject to formal process, due process requires notice and a "meaningful opportunity" to
~

be heard. Id. at err 20. Simply, if a statutory scheme provides a "meaningful chance" to
protect an interest, a challenging party "may not complain of the termination of his
interest when he fails to strictly comply with its procedures." In re Adoption of Baby Girl
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T ., 2012 UT 78, err 20. "Yet the promise of the Due Process Clause is limited. It is a
protection against state action-not a charter aimed at regulating the actions of private
parties." Adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, err 16.

b. Notice
Though he does not directly state it, Mr. Nuno essentially complains that he was
not provided "notice" because he did not know and could not know that Mr. and Mrs.
Hart were married when the children were conceived and born. This point has been
addressed and refuted above. However, his complaint is against Mr. and Mrs. Hart,
private parties, and not against "state action" as required in Adoption of B. Y. Mr. Nuno
~

does not complain that the government failed to provide notice. "Nor could he ... [T]here
is no constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause that the state give actual
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notice of the statutory requirements for establishing parental rights." Id. at err 19 (citing
Sanchez v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984))(internal quotation marks
omitted).

c. Opportunity to be Heard
"The due process right to an opportunity to be heard is by no means a blanket
prohibition of procedural prerequisites to the preservation of a legal right." Adoption of
B.Y., 2015 UT 67, err 26 (emphasis in original). On the other hand, that does not mean
that procedural prerequisites are immune from due process scrutiny. "In past cases, [the
Utah Supreme Court] found this standard to be met by a showing of impossibility." Id. at
err 28 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court in Adoption of B. Y. explained the

applicability of the "impossibility" showing and the effect of not being able to make that
showing:
The impossibility inquiry centers on the father's factual basis for
anticipating the need to fulfill the requirements of Utah law to protect his
legal rights.
[A] father who knows of a pregnancy and has reason to suspect that his
child will be born in or placed for adoption in Utah must fulfill the
requirements of the Utah Adoption Act. And such father has a "sufficient
opportunity" to be heard and thus cannot establish impossibility.
For reasons explained above, a putative father who knows of a pregnancy
and has reason to suspect that his child will be born in or placed for
adoption in Utah is on notice of the applicability of Utah Code section 78B6-106. Supra err 34. And because that provision clearly states that a private
representation is insufficient to excuse compliance with the Adoption Act,
a father who knows of a pregnancy and of a likely birth in Utah but ignores
the Utah statute in reliance on a mother's representations has been given
all the process that he is due. Such a father proceeds at his peril if he relies
on such representations. And if those representations are not fulfilled, his
recourse is in a civil suit against the mother ...
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Id. at <JI<JI 33, 34, 39 (emphasis added).
Mr. Nuno complains that he did not have an opportunity to undertake effective
steps to assert his claim for paternity and custody of the minor children, and therefore that
he was denied a meaningful chance. Brief of Appellant, pp. 41-42. This is not true.
Despite anything that Mr. and Mrs. Hart may have told him, Mr. Nuno claims he was
aware of a pregnancy, but he failed to take any legal steps to follow the Utah statutes to
protect the rights he claims to have. For example, he could have married Mrs. Hart
during the brief period of divorce. He did not do so. He could have filed a paternity
action and complied with Utah Code prior to the birth of the Harts' child. He did not do
so. Instead Mr. Nuno allegedly relied on misrepresentations from the Harts and ignored
,..;;;

the Utah statutes. He therefore was given "all the process that he is due." His remedy is
not to now claim paternity, but to file a civil suit if he believes such is warranted.

d. Opportunity Through Utah Code§ 30-Sa-101
Utah's Custody and Visitation for Persons Other than Parents Act allows a person
other than a parent to obtain "custodial or visitation rights" pursuant to the chapter. Utah
Code § 30-5a-103(2). A '"person other than a parent' means a person related to the child
by marriage or blood ... " Id. at 102(2). In Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Michael
~

H., he found that the California statutory scheme satisfied due process because of another
section of California Civil Code which provided an opportunity for other interested
persons to obtain visitation rights of children in limited circumstances. Michael H., 491

31

U.S. at 133-34 (Stevens, concurring). Utah Code provides a similar opportunity for
persons who are not legally defined as a parent.
In addition to the Adoption and Paternity codes that Mr. Nuno did not attempt to
follow until too late, Mr. Nuno also had an opportunity to proceed under Utah Code§ 305a-101, et seq. to seek custodial and visitation rights. While Mr. Nuno claims to be the
father of the minor children, as a matter of law he is not a "parent." He therefore had an
opportunity to proceed under this statute as he claims to be related by blood to the
children. Mr. Nuno failed to seize the opportunity to proceed under this chapter despite
having the opportunity to do so.
In summary, Mr. Nuno-an alleged biological father of a child born to a mother
who is married to the child's presumed father-is not entitled to substantive due process
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rights under the constitution. Even if he were, he had notice and an opportunity to assert
those rights within the Adoption, Paternity, and CustodyNisitation codes, which satisfy
procedural due process. Mr. Nuno was therefore given all process that was due, and his
own failure to timely or appropriately do so cannot be found as a violation of whatever
constitutional rights he may claim to have.
IV.

ALLOWING MR. NUNO TO ATTACK THE MARRIAGE AND
REQUIRE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL VIOLATES THE HART'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND TO DUE
PROCESS
A. Allowing Mr. Nuno and the Courts to Attack the Harts' Marriage and the
Paternity of Their Children Would Violate Their Constitutional Rights

The Supreme Court has declared that "certain intimate human relationships must
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships
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in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme."
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The "rights embodied in family
relationships are inherent, natural, and retained rights as follows: The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment." In re JP, 648 P. 2d 1364, 1374 (Utah 1982)(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972)). ""While the State has a legitimate interest in the creation and
dissolution of the marriage contract, the family has a privacy interest in the upbringing
;;;

and education of children and the intimacies of the marital relationship which is protected
by the Constitution against undue state interference." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417,446 (1990).
Because the constitution protects against government intrusion and not private
intrusion, Mr. Nuno's personal attack on the Harts' marriage and family relations cannot

....
.-)

in and of itself violate the constitutional rights of the Hart family. However, if a court
endorses the attack by allowing it to proceed through additional discovery, court
hearings, and trial with the court making the ultimate decision, the intrusion becomes
governmental and not simply private action. This type of intrusion on the family not only
violates the State's public policy of protecting marriages and family from outside attacks,
but also would constitute undue state interference.
The Harts' privacy interest in the upbringing of their four children and the

@

intimacies of their marital relationship should not be interfered with by requiring or
authorizing the trial court to intrude and interfere further into their lives and decisions.
33

Even if Mr. Nuno's allegations were true, it is clear that Mr. and Mrs. Hart have made the
decision to leave Mr. Nuno out of their lives and the lives of the minor children, and that
they do not want him interfering or being involved with them. If the Court were to
endorse his intrusion and require a full case, it would be an unconstitutional intrusion by
the state.
B. Permitting Mr. Nuno to Proceed Would Violate Mr. Hart's Constitutional
Rights as the Legal and Presumed Father of the Children

It is well established that the "interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children ... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
[the United States Supreme] Court." Jones v. Jones, 2013 UT App 174 <j[ 10. "When the
court has recognized a due process right it deems 'fundamental,' it consistently has
applied a standard of strict scrutiny to the protection of such a right ... Under this
standard, a fundamental right is protected except in the limited circumstance in which an
infringement of it is shown to be 'narrowly tailored' to protect a 'compelling
governmental interest.'" Jones v. Jones, 2015 UT 84, <j[CJI 26-27. The Utah Supreme Court
has also held that "[p]arental rights are at their apex for parents who are married." In re
J.P., 648 P. 2d at 1374-75.
In this matter, Mr. Hart is the father-both legal and presumed-of all four of the
children born to him and Mrs. Hart. He and Mrs. Hart are married parents, placing his
fundamental parental rights at their apex. The children were conceived and born during
the marriage. Mr. Hart was present at the birth of both children, is listed on their birth
certificates, loves both of them very much, and intends to remain married and continue to
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raise them together with the Harts' two older children as children of the marriage. R. 276.
Because of their fundamental nature, they are protected and the standard of strict scrutiny
applies, necessitating a showing of a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored.

If Mr. Nuno were allowed to proceed with a challenge to Mr. Hart's paternity to
the children, it would unconstitutionally infringe on Mr. Hart's fundamental parental
rights. There is no compelling state interest in providing an alleged biological father with
parental rights when a presumed father exists. In fact, the UUPA indicates just the
opposite-that there is a compelling state interest in preventing the alleged biological
~

father from attacking the marriage and the presumed father's rights. See R.P. v. K.S.W.,
2014 UT App 38.

Therefore, allowing Mr. Nuno and other alleged biological fathers to pursue a
paternity action against a presumed father married to the mother would be an
unconstitutional infringement on the presumed father's fundamental rights to his
children.

v.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.

Mr. and Mrs. Hart respectfully request that the Court order Mr. Nuno to pay for
their attorney fees and costs incurred litigating the present appeal. "[W]hen a party is
entitled to attorney fees below and prevails on appeal, that party is also entitled to fees
vi,)

reasonably incurred on appeal." Dillon v. Southern Mgmt. Corp. Ret. Tr., 2014 UT 14, 'II
61 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Harts requested attorney fees below based on

~

Utah Code §30-3-3 ("in any action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child
support ... in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees,
35

and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other
party to prosecute or defend the action ... [and] (2) In any action to enforce an order of
custody, parent-time, child support ... in a domestic case, the court may award costs and
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or
defense.") and § 78B-5-825 ("In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."}. The trial court found that the Harts had
substantially prevailed, but required that they file an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees for Mr.
Nuno to respond to. R. 517. The Affidavit and a Motion for Entry of Judgment on
Attorney Fees were filed and responded to, but no final decision has been issued by the
trial court. R. 565, 572.
The Harts should be awarded their attorney fees below and on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should Affirm the trial court's dismissal because (1) the
issues were not properly preserved; (2) Mr. Nuno has no substantive constitutional rights;
(3) he is not entitled to due process protections; and (4) even if he were, the provisions of
Utah Code § 30-5a-101 et seq. satisfy the demands of due process by granting him a
reasonable opportunity to be heard regarding custody of and visitation with the minor
children. Further, to allow Mr. Nuno to proceed would violate the constitutional rights of

36

Mr. and Mrs. Hart and their entire family. Therefore, the Court should AFFIRM the
dismissal of Mr. Nuno's petition for paternity.

Dated December 11, 2015.

JatD.~m

D. GRANT DICKINSON
Attorneys for Appellees Mr. and Mrs. Hart
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Addendum A
Utah Code§ 30-5a-101, et seq.
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Utah Code
@

30-Sa-101 Title.
This chapter is known as the 11 Custody and Visitation for Persons Other than Parents Act. 11

Enacted by Chapter 272, 2008 General Session

®

I

I

@

@
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Utah Code

30-Sa-102 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
11
(1) Parent" means a biological or adoptive parent.
11
(2) Person other than a parent" means a person related to the child by marriage or blood,
including:
(a) siblings;
(b) aunts;
(c) uncles;
(d) grandparents; or
(e) current or former step-parents, or any of the persons in Subsections (2)(a) through (d) in a
step relationship to the child.
Enacted by Chapter 272, 2008 General Session
~i
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Utah Code
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30-5a-103 Custody and visitation for persons other than a parent.
(1) In accordance with Section 62A-4a-201, it is the public policy of this state that parents retain the
fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, supervision, upbringing,
and education of their children. There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent's decisions are
in the child's best interests.
(2) A court may find the presumption in Subsection (1) rebutted and grant custodial or visitation
rights to a person other than a parent who, by clear and convincing evidence, has established
all of the following:
(a) the person has intentionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent;
(b) the person and the child have formed an emotional bond and created a parent-child type
relationship;
(c) the person contributed emotionally or financially to the child's well being;
(d) assumption of the parental role is not the result of a financially compensated surrogate care
arrangement;
{e) continuation of the relationship between the person and the child would be in the child's best
interests;
{f) loss or cessation of the relationship between the person and the child would be detrimental to
the child; and
{g) the parent:
{i) is absent; or
{ii) is found by a court to have abused or neglected the child.
(3) A proceeding under this chapter may be commenced by filing a verified petition, or petition
supported by an affidavit, in the juvenile court if a matter is pending, or in the district court in the
county in which the child:
{a) currently resides; or
(b) lived with a parent or a person other than a parent who acted as a parent within six months
before the commencement of the action.
(4) A proceeding under this chapter may be filed in a pending divorce, parentage action, or other
proceeding, including a proceeding in the juvenile court, involving custody of or visitation with a
child.
{5) The petition shall include detailed facts supporting the petitioner's right to file the petition
including the criteria set forth in Subsection (2) and residency information as set forth in Section
788-13-209.
(6) A proceeding under this chapter may not be filed against a parent who is actively serving
outside the state in any branch of the military.
(7) Notice of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter shall be served in accordance with the rules of
civil procedure on all of the following:
(a) the child's biological, adopted, presumed, declarant, and adjudicated parents;
(b) any person who has court-ordered custody or visitation rights;
(c) the child's guardian;
(d) the guardian ad litem, if one has been appointed;
(e) a person or agency that has physical custody of the child or that claims to have custody or
visitation rights; and
(f) any other person or agency that has previously appeared in any action regarding custody of or
visitation with the child.
(8) The court may order a custody evaluation to be conducted in any action brought under this
chapter.

Page 1

Utah Code

(9) The court may enter temporary orders in an action brought under this chapter pending the entry
of final orders.
Enacted by Chapter 272, 2008 General Session
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30-5a-104 Exceptions.
This chapter may not be used to seek, obtain, maintain or continue custody of, or visitation
with, a child who has been relinquished for adoption, or adopted pursuant to an order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Enacted by Chapter 108, 2009 General Session
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AddendumB
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 108

12/11/2015

https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp108.html

Rule 108. Objection to court commissioner's recommendation.
(a) A recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the
court. A party may file a written objection to the recommendation within 14 days after the
recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under
advisement, within 14 days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A judge's
counter-signature on the commissioner's recommendation does not affect the review of an
objection.
(b) The objection must identify succinctly and with particularity the findings of fact, the
conclusions of law, or the part of the recommendation to which the objection is made and state
the relief sought. The memorandum in support of the objection must explain succinctly and with
particularity why the findings, conclusions, or recommendation are incorrect. The time for filing,
length and content of memoranda, affidavits, and request to submit for decision are as stated
for motions in Rule 7.
(c) If there has been a substantial change of circumstances since the commissioner's
recommendation, the judge may, in the interests of judicial economy, consider new evidence.
Otherwise, any evidence, whether by proffer, testimony or exhibit, not presented to the
commissioner shall not be presented to the judge.
(d)(1) The judge may hold a hearing on any objection.
(d)(2) If the hearing before the commissioner was held under Utah Code Title 62A,
Chapter 15, Part 6, Utah State Hospital and Other Mental Health Facilities, Utah Code Title
788, Chapter 7, Protective Orders, or on an order to show cause for the enforcement of a
judgment, any party has the right, upon request, to present testimony and other evidence on
genuine issues of material fact.
(d)(3) If the hearing before the commissioner was in a domestic relations matter other
than a cohabitant abuse protective order, any party has the right, upon request:
(d)(3)(A) to present testimony and other evidence on genuine issues of material fact
relevant to custody; and
(d)(3)(B) to a hearing at which the judge may require testimony or proffers of testimony
on genuine issues of material fact relevant to issues other than custody.
(e) If a party does not request a hearing, the judge may hold a hearing or review the record
of evidence, whether by proffer, testimony or exhibit, before the commissioner.

(f) The judge will make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the
evidence, whether by proffer, testimony or exhibit, presented to the judge, or, if there was no
hearing before the judge, based on the evidence presented to the commissioner.

https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp1 OB.html
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AddendumC
Declaration of Brian J. Hart in Support of
Motion to Dismiss (R. 276)

Yaiko Osaki Carranza, No. 10068
MOODY BROWN LAW
Attorneys for Respondent
2525 N. Canyon Rd.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 356-8300
Fax: (801) 356-8400

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
75 East 80 North, Suite 202, American Fork, UT 84003

EMMANUEL NUNO,
Petitioner,
V.

KIMBERLY LANE HART,
Respondent.

DECLARATION OF BRIAN J. HART
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS
Civil No. 144100205
Judge Christine Johnson
Commissioner Thomas R Patton

I, BRIAN J. HART, state as follows:
I. I am married to the Respondent in the above-entitled action. And the minor children
of this case, G.L.H. (DOB August 2012) and H.H. (DOB December 2013) were born as issue of
our marriage.
2. Respondent and I were first married on July 7, 2007 and we had two minor children
as issue of that marriage. Respondent and I divorced on March 26, 20 I 2. Respondent and I
again remarried on August 22, 2012, and we have been married ever since (See Exhibit A Copy of Marriage Certificate).
3. Both G.L.H., and H.H. were born while Respondent and I were married to each other.
~

I am listed as the father on both children's birth certificates, and I have been present at both of

the children's births. I love both G.L.H. and H.H. very much, and it is my intent to remain
married to Respondent and to raise G.L.H. and H.H., together with our older two children as
children of our marriage.
4. Neither I nor Respondent have challenged the paternity of the children subject to this
case.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, I solemnly declare or affirm under criminal
penalty of Perjury in the State of Utah that the foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge.

Dated this 29th

day of October,2014.

Isl Brian J. Hart permission given via email on I 0129114

BRIAN J. HART

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member or and/or employed by the law firm of Moody Brown
Law, 2525 North Canyon Rd., Provo, Utah 84604, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule
5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION
OF BRIAN J. HART IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served upon the
following on this 30th day of October, 2014:
00

Don Petersen

•
•
•

e-Filing (UCJA Rule 4-503)
U.S. Regular Mail
Facsimile Transmission
E-Mail
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Exhibit A
Copy of Marriage Certificate
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AddendumD
Declaration of Respondent in Support of
Motion to Dismiss (R. 266)

~

Yaiko Osaki Carranza, No. 10068
MOODY BROWN LAW
Attorneys for Respondent
2525 N. Canyon Rd.
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 356-8300
Fax: (801) 356-8400

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
75 East 80 North, Suite 202, American Fork, UT 84003

EMMANUEL NUNO,
Petitioner,

DECLARATION OF RESPONDENT IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

V.

KIMBERLY LANE HART,
Respondent.

Civil No. 144100205
Judge Christine Johnson
Commissioner Thomas R Patton

I, KIMBERLY LANE HART, state as follows:
1. I am the Respondent in the above-entitled action.
2. At no time have Petitioner and I been married.
3. I am the Mother of the minor children of this case, G.L.H. (DOB August 2012) and
.;)

H.H. (DOB December 2013).

4. I am married to Brian J. Hart and we were married on July 7, 2007, we had two minor
children, and then we divorced on March 26, 2012. Brian J. Hart and I again remarried on
August 22, 2012, and we have been married ever since (See Exhibit A - Copy of Marriage
Certificate).
5. Both G.L.H., and H.H. were born while my husband and I were married to each other.

My husband is listed as the father on both children's birth certificates. G.L.H. was born in
Redacted and I have requested a copy of the birth certificate from the state of Redacteq I will
present that to the court as soon as I receive it. However, I have a copy of G.L.H. 's vaccination
records from 'Redacted which refer to G.L.H. as"

Reaacted

" (See Exhibit B - G.L.H.

vaccination record) . From the day he was born, my son, G.L.H. has always had my husband's
last name. My other child, H.H. was born in Redacted and as shown on his birth certificate, my
husband, Brian Hart, is listed on the child's birth certificate, and the child also bears the

''Redactea

last name (See Exhibit C - H.H. Birth Certificate).
6. My husband, Brian J. Hait, and I intend to remain married to each other and to raise
our four children as children of our maITiage.
7. Neither I nor Mr. Hart have challenged the paternity of the children subject to this
case.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-705, I solemnly declare or affirm under criminal
penalty of Perjury in the State of Utah that the foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge.
Dated this 29 th

day of October,2014.

Isl Kimberly L. Hart permission given via email on 10129114
KIMBERLY LANE HART, Respondent

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member or and/or employed by the law firm of Moody Brown
Law, 2525 North Canyon Rd., Provo, Utah 84604, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule
5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION
OF RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served upon the
following on this 30th day of October, 2014:
[&]

Don Petersen

•
•
•

e-Filing (UCJA Rule 4-503)
U.S. Regular Mail
Facsimile Transmission
E-Mail
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Exhibit B
G .L.H. vaccination record
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(ij- Name:

Date of Birth:

Redacted

08/23/2012
--

_,

•

--•

•

·-

Type of Vaccine
,2

-

(DTaP/DT) Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

Mo/Day/Yr

Mo/Day/Yr

Mo/Day/Yr

Mo/Day/Yr

Mo/Day/Yr

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Notes:

Signature of Provider

(IPV) Pollo
Signature of Provider

~

{Hlb) Haemophllus lnfluenzae type B

.

Name of Hlb Manufacturer
Signature of Provider

(PCV) Pneumococcal Conjugate

ii

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

fl d--,.

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Signature of Provider

(Hep B) Hepatitis B

0 '9 I :J.. 3

Signature of Provider

~.4t,tl,y,p;.i,J

(Hep A) Hepatitis A
·?

I

I

.

....

ff

Signature of Provider

(RV) Aotavirus
Name of RV Manufacturer
Signature of Provider
i/21

(MMR) Measles, Mumps, Rubella
Signature of Provider

{VAR) varlcella

✓

0 box if Hx of chickenpox

-;-,x~_,,:

;,,;'(,

Signature of Provider

-·;,.

(Flu) Influenza

:r:;~~r

. ~.~f·

r5-1:..;.~z:

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

·/

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I•, '.::'/} ,,;

Print Live or Inactivated
Signature of Provider

(HPV) Human Papllloma Virus

C, Name of HPV Manufacturer
Signature of Provider

(Td) Tetanus, Diphtheria
Signature of Provider

-.ii) (Tdap) Tetanus, Diphtheria, Pertussis

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

;,:-,'t)'.:}_0!',\):
'(;,'-/},:
-•--

-- Other:
Signature of Provider
URC3000 (00/10)

-

,-

'

--

-,

l)&rfif,, "."::,<::
•- -. -~
Date

Newborn
Screen

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

Signature of Provider
',\I

-

:" _-\:,,;,
---''-.Y::'_>-,,:.
: __ ;_ 1t"".t·

I

Signature of Provider

Other:

--

}f§'.%~-; :;•·,<--:...-~,,
'.:-t-•<ZMf,\) ":,->'<

1::,}::,{\/il-Itittt 1;~;?;({~1-/.·.'-"):!-::

Signature of Provider

-~ (PPV23) Pneumococcal Polysaccharide

, ,.~~ ~.-·-~.::-- ·:,

I,

Signature of Provider

(MCV) Meningococcal Conjugate

.,

TB Skin

Test

)S .)._l/•/J.

Result

Provider

f~-(-osp :+-Ii..

;

VACCINES FOR CHILDREN PROGRAM
The VFC program is a federal ly funded program that
provides vaccines at no cost to ch ild ren who might not
otherwise be vaccinated beca use of inabi li ty to pay.
Vaccines are distributed at no charge to th ose private
physicians' offices and public hea lth clinics registered as
VFC providers.
Providers & Parents: Learn more abou t the VFC
Program at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/proqrarns/vfc/

Redacted
Arizona.
Departn1ent of
Health Services

Newborn Hearinq Screen

p,.b-h

Init ial Screen
Second Screen
Complete by hospital discharge Complete by 1 month of age

·~·'>~-\..., \ ';).,

Date

~

Right

_L Pass

-

Refer

-

Pass

-

Refer

Left

~

-

Refer

-

Pass

-

Refer

I

.

'

Pass

Monitor for
late onset
and
progressive
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Refer fo1· 2nd
Mon ito r for
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late onset
(1•e fe1' to
and
ped iatr ic
progressive
audiolog ist if
losses
over 6 mo .)

Refer to a
ped iatric
audiologist

for
complet e
eva luat ion
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H.H. birth certificate
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